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5Security of Mineral Tenure in 
South Africa: Carrot or Stick?*
P J Badenhorst**
The notion and features of the security of South African mineral tenure are 
discussed in this article. On enactment of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act, 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) on 1 May 2004, a radical new mineral 
law regime was introduced in South Africa. The state acts as custodian of all 
mineral resources and is responsible for security of mineral tenure as one of 
the objectives of the MPRDA. The MPRDA is examined in order to determine 
to what extent security of mineral tenure is provided. Examination takes place 
against the background and the strikes and violence that plagued the South 
African platinum industry during 2012–2013, as external factors that may 
impact indirectly on security of mineral tenure. Security of mineral tenure 
also has to be viewed within the context of the transformation objectives of 
the MPRDA. It is found that security of mineral tenure is afforded to current 
holders of prospecting rights and mining rights and some former holders of old 
order rights. It is shown that the holders of unused old order rights were not 
afforded security of tenure and were unsuccessful in claiming compensation 
in the courts for their loss of former rights. It is indicated that such loss should 
be viewed within the context of constitutionally based transformational goals 
of redress and access to the mineral resources. It is argued that the security of 
tenure is also affected by external factors, the manner in which the Department 
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comments and suggestions of Professor Hanri Mostert of the University of Cape Town 
and the two unknown referees but, however, remains responsible for the correctness of 
the end product. The law is stated as at 31 July 2013.
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Designed in conjunction with the International Bar Association, 
this LL.M is a tailored, professional programme for graduates and 
practising lawyers seeking career-enhancing postgraduate legal 
qualifications. The programme is aimed specifically at building  
cross-border commercial legal knowledge.
The benefits of the LL.M in International Legal 
Practice 
You choose what to study
• Tailor what you study to your career path and/or practice area  
• All modules are practice-led with contributions from leading global  
law firms
You choose how to study
• Study your LL.M at a time and place that suits you
Full-time LL.M in London 
• Starts in September 2014 at our London Moorgate centre 
• Three workshops per week – 2.5 hours each 
• Supported by i-Tutorials, online test and feedback exercises and 
independent learning and research 
S-mode modules 
• Start in January or July each year 
• Online study with one-to-one online supervision from a University tutor 
• Nine units per module
• We supply an extensive suite of user-friendly, practical course material 
including electronic learning aids
You choose your pace of learning
• Modular course design enables you to determine your own pace of 
learning
• S-mode modules start in January and July each year 
Register now and take that step for educational 
and career development
For further information, and to register 
please email:  llm@lawcol.co.uk
www.law.ac.uk/llm
‘It has exceeded my expectations…this 
course in its entirety is the best study 
experience that I have had.’
‘The i-tutorials are very easy to use and 
informative, an excellent way for busy 
practitioners to learn.’
Module First available start date
Business, finance and the legal services market January 2014
International intellectual property practice January 2014
International commercial legal practice January 2014
International public companies practice January 2014
International capital markets and loans practice January 2014
International mergers and acquisitions practice January 2014
International antitrust practice January 2014
International business organisations January 2014
International arbitration practice January 2014
International joint ventures January 2014
LL.M in  
International Legal Practice
Global Professional Training with the International  
Bar Association and the University of Law – a career-
enhancing commitment to excellence. 
Journal of EnErgy & natural rEsourcEs law Vol 32 No 1 20146
of Mineral Resources administers the statute and recent case law. Security 
of mineral tenure should be viewed in a broad sense to determine its true 
extent. Security of mineral tenure should be seen and cherished by the South 
African Government as a tool to attract foreign investment rather than a stick 
to achieve short-term political outcomes.
‘Unemployed workers drift downstream. An injury to one is indeed an 
injury to all.’***
Introduction 
On 16 August 2012, a special unit of the South African Police Service fired on a 
group of strikers at the Lonmin mine, at Marikana, near Rustenburg. Thirty-four 
people were killed, and 78 wounded.1 The shooting was the most deadly use of 
force by the African National Congress (ANC)-led government against civilians 
since the Sharpeville massacre by the former South African government during 
the apartheid era.2 Prior to the shooting, a wildcat strike by workers took place 
at the mine owing to the alleged exploitation of workers.3 The strike occurred 
against the background of animosity and violence between the ANC-allied 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and its new rival, the Association of 
Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU)4 and the killing of strikers, police 
and security personnel at the mine. The protests at Marikana quickly spread to 
other mines and calls were made for a nationwide miners’ strike.5 An agreement 
was eventually reached between the Lonmin mine and the unions,6 while the 
President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, appointed the Farlam Commission to 
investigate the ‘tragic incidents’ at the Lonmin mine in Marikana.7 
*** From the ‘sketch’ of the ‘Bridge on the River Kwaito’ by P J Badenhorst, ‘Transitional 
Arrangements in Terms of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 
of 2002: Crossing a Narrow Bridge?’ (2002) 23 Obiter 250, 280–281.
1 ‘South Africa’s Lonmin Marikana mine clashes killed 34’, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-19292909.
2 ‘The Marikana Miners of South Africa’, www.afrostylemag.com/ASM8/miners.php; the 
government was accused of murdering the miners (‘Zuma’s “murderous regime” killed 
Marikana miners, says Malema’, http://mg.co.za/article/2013-07-11-zumas-murderous-
regime-killed-marikana-miners-says-malema.
3 ‘The Marikana Mine Massacre and South Africa’s Volatile labour market’, http://
analysisintelligence.com/osint/the-marikana-mine-massacre-and-south-africas-volatile-
labor-market.
4 ‘Killing Field’, www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2012/08/17/killing-field.
5 ‘Malema calls for national mining strike’, www.miningweekly.com/article/malema-calls-
for-national-mining-strike-2012-09-11.
6 ‘Striking South African miners, company reach deal’, http://edition.cnn.
com/2012/09/18/world/africa/south-africa-mine-strike.
7 ‘The Marikana Commission of Enquiry’, www.marikanacomm.org.za.
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Violent strikes also occurred at the platinum mines of Anglo American 
Platinum (Amplats), the world’s largest platinum producer. Citing the failure 
of workers to attend disciplinary hearings, Amplats dismissed 12,000 people.8 
The violent strikes resulted in a loss of production and Amplats reported 
a ZAR6.33bn operating loss for the year to 31 December 2012.9 Amplats 
announced it would mothball its two least profitable platinum mines, sell 
another and cut 14,000 jobs.10 The announcement was severely criticised by 
labour unions and government who claimed that they were not consulted.11 
The ANC insisted that Amplats’ mining right should be revoked and awarded 
to a company that would continue production and save jobs.12 After scathing 
criticism from the Minister of Mineral Resources (the ‘Minister’),13 who 
also threatened to review the company’s mining right, Amplats agreed 
to postpone the official retrenchment process.14 Negotiations took place 
between Amplats, the unions and the government.15 However, violence 
at the mine continued,16 plunging the platinum industry17 into a crisis.18 
Labour unrest in the agricultural sector19 and civil unrest20 also followed. 
8 ‘Amplats fires 12 000 workers ahead of talks’, http://mg.co.za/article/2012-10-05-
amplats-fires-12-000-workers-ahead-of-talks.
9 ‘Anglo American Platinum sees loss after strikes’, www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21319273.
10 ‘South Africa: Amplats to close mines, fire 14,000 workers’, www.globalpost.com/
dispatch/news/regions/africa/south-africa/130115/south-africa-amplats-close-mines-
fire-14000-workers.
11 ‘Amplats mining licence should be revoked’, http://ewn.co.za/2013/01/18/Amplats-
mining-licence-should-be-revoked.
12 Ibid.
13 ‘Anglo mining rights under threat’, http://news.acts.co.za/blog/2013/01/anglo-
mining-rights-under-threat.
14 ‘Amplats: The crisis continues’, www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-02-05-amplats-
the-crisis-continues.
15 Meetings between President Zuma and the chairman of Anglo-American Plc took 
place. See further ‘Amplats sceptical on saving jobs’, http://mg.co.za/article/2013-02-
20-amplats-skeptical-on-saving-jobs.
16 ‘Thirteen people injured during Amplats clash’, http://mg.co.za/article/2013-02-
18-thirteen-people-injured-during-amplats-clash; ‘Werkers geskiet in nuwe Amplats-
geweld’, www.sake24.com/Maatskappye/Mynwese/Werkers-geskiet-in-nuwe-Amplats-
geweld-20130218; ‘Violence flares at Amplats over trade union rivalry’; www.bdlive.
co.za/national/labour/2013/02/19/violence-flares-at-amplats-over-trade-union-rivalry.
17 As to the history of the South African platinum industry, see G Capps, ‘Victim of its own 
Success? The Platinum Mining Industry and the Apartheid Mineral Property System in 
South Africa’s Political Transition’ (2012) 39(131) Review of African Political Economy 63.
18 ‘Platinum industry could plunge deeper into crisis’, www.sabc.co.za/news/a/
b4b0ba804ea01e0bb45ffe7da4cd6ad7/Platinum-industry-could-plunge-deeper-into-
crisis-20132002. See also ‘RBPlat to cut costs, staff as results slump’, www.bdlive.co.za/
business/mining/2013/03/05/rbplat-to-cut-costs-staff-as-results-slump.
19 ‘South Africa: Farm workers’ protests turn violent’, http://news.yahoo.com/south-
africa-farm-workers-protests-turn-violent-125849941--finance.html. See also ‘Western 
Cape 2012 Farm Workers’ Strike’.
20 ‘Sasolburg protesters set fire to trucks, attack police’, www.bdlive.co.za/
national/2013/01/21/sasolburg-protesters-set-fire-to-trucks-attack-police.
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Subsequently, all the stakeholders in the mining industry signed a peace and 
stability framework to stop violence in the industry,21 and Amplats has also 
signed a labour recognition agreement with AMCU.22 Rivalry and animosity 
between NUM and AMCU and instability in the mining industry, however, 
continued and are expected to do so in the future.23 More than ZAR10bn 
was lost in gold and platinum production during the mining sector stoppages 
in the 2012/2013 financial year.24 The South African Revenue Services has 
suffered a loss of ZAR11.3bn in taxes from the mining unrest.25 The South 
African Government’s credit rating and the viability ratings of major banks 
were downgraded by international ratings agencies Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s and Fitch in the latter half of 2012 and the beginning of 2013.26 The 
much-needed foreign investment in the South African mining industry is 
on the decline and cause for concern. Foreign investment in the amount 
ZAR703bn will be needed over the next three years just to finance the 
ZAR24.5bn record high South African trade deficit of 2013.27
If, for argument’s sake, the Minister were to cancel28 the mining rights of a 
company like Amplats under such circumstances, and award them to another 
company, such a decision would have to be taken within the context of labour 
and civil unrest, loss of employment, production, income and revenue, 
a need for foreign investment and the ability of a new company to mine 
successfully. Such a political decision would also have legal implications. In 
such a scenario, the following legal questions29 arise with respect to Amplats:
21 ‘Mining unions, govt sign peace accord’, http://ewn.co.za/2013/02/26/Mining-
unions-govt-sign-peace-accord; ‘AMCU signs mine peace accord’, www.miningweekly.
com/article/amcu-article-2013-02-25.
22 ‘AMCU takes control at Amplats’, http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-03-amcu-takes-
control-at-amplats. See further ‘AMCU fights for recognition’, http://mg.co.za/
article/2013-03-08-00-amcu-fights-for-recognition.
23 See ‘Mining troubles rumble on’, www.bdlive.co.za/business/mining/2013/03/03/
mining-troubles-rumble-on; ‘Lonmin strike: Tension between unions hampers mine’s 
output’, http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-05-lonmin-strike-tension-between-unions-
affects-mines-output; ‘Threats to peace in shackland’, http://mg.co.za/article/2013-07-
19-00-threats-to-peace-in-shackland.
24 Press Release of the South African Institute of Race Relations: ‘Billions lost due to 
strikes – 11 April 2013’, www.sairr.org.za/media/media-releases/Billions%20lost%20
due%20to%20strikes.pdf.
25 ‘SA loses R11.3-billion in taxes from mining unrest’, http://mg.co.za/article/2013-04-
02-sa-loses-r1-billion-in-taxes-from-mining-unrest#comment_thread.
26 See above, n 24.
27 ‘Trade deficit high, expected to worsen’, www.bdlive.co.za/economy/2013/03/01/
trade-deficit-high-expected-to-worsen.
28 See ‘Grounds for cancellation of prospecting and mining rights’ below.
29 The question also arose whether Amplats complied with the scaling-down provisions of 
s 52 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA). At that time, 
s 52 did not require direct consultation with the Minister.
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• Can the Minister legally terminate a mining right under such circumstances?
• What are the remedies for the holder of a mining right?
These questions can be answered simply by looking at the terms and 
conditions of the mining right and the relevant provisions of the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 28 of 2002 (MPRDA)30 and 
determining whether (a) the terms were breached; (b) provisions not 
complied with; and (c) the Minister’s decision can be reviewed judicially. A 
much broader issue is, however, at stake, namely, does a holder of a mining 
right, such as Amplats, have security of mineral tenure in South Africa? 
And if so, what does it entail? Security of mineral tenure is important for 
any developing country; it has been ranked as one of the most important 
criteria for mining companies when deciding on investment preferences.31 
The focus of this article will be to examine the meaning and features of 
‘security of tenure’ in terms of the MPRDA with reference to prospecting 
rights, mining permits and mining rights32 and the old order rights that 
continued to exist during different interim periods in terms of the MPRDA. 
Examination of security of tenure will take place against the background 
of the recent problems experienced in the platinum mining industry and 
external factors such as economic, labour, political and social issues.
MPRDA
On commencement of the MPRDA on 1 May 2004, a new mineral law 
regime was introduced by the ANC-led government. The preceding mineral 
law system (old order) made provision for privately held mineral rights, 
30 The MPRDA was amended on 7 June 2013 by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Amendment Act, 49 of 2008 (Proc 14, Government Gazette 36512, 
31 May 2013) and will be discussed accordingly. The commencement of s 11(1), as 
substituted by s 8(a) of Act 49 of 2008, has been postponed by proclamation (Proc 
17, Government Gazette 36541, 6 June 2013) and will be put into operation by 
proclamation or further amendment (Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Bill 2013). The focus of the author’s analysis will be on existing law and not the 
political and historical background to the MPRDA. In this regard, see further G 
Capps, ‘A Bourgeois Reform with Social Justice? The Contradictions of the Mineral 
Development Bill and Black Economic Empowerment in the South African Platinum 
Mining Industry’ (2012) 39(132) Review of African Political Economy 315 who shows 
the evolution and contradictions of the ANC’s post-apartheid mineral policy during the 
crucial period between the Mineral Development Bill of 2000 and the enactment of the 
MPRDA, which retained core principles of this policy, while making some concessions 
to the mining industry.
31 M O Dale, ‘Security of Tenure as a Key Issue facing the International Mining Company: 
A South African Perspective’ (1996) 14 JERL 298; E Bastida, ‘A Review of the Concept 
of Security of Mineral Tenure: Issues and Challenges’ (2001) 19 JERL 31, 32.
32 The discussion applies mutatis mutandis to exploration and production rights in respect 
of petroleum, which provisions of the MPRDA fall beyond the scope of this article.
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prospecting rights, mining rights and (transitional) statutory prospecting 
or mining rights.33 Before prospecting or mining rights could be exercised, 
authorisation was required in the form of a prospecting permit or a mining 
authorisation34 in accordance with the Minerals Act 50 of 1991 (the ‘Minerals 
Act’).35 Under the MPRDA the previous system of rights was superseded by 
a new administrative law system36 whereby: (a) the common law mineral 
rights were replaced by similar prospecting and mining rights granted 
by the Minister; and (b) the statutory authorisations were fused into the 
prospecting right or mining right thus granted.37 In terms of the MPRDA, 
the state, acting through the Minister, is the custodian of mineral and 
petroleum resources,38 which, in turn, belong to the South African nation.39 
As custodian, the Minister (or her delegate)40 may grant, administer and 
terminate reconnaissance permissions, prospecting rights, permissions to 
remove minerals, mining permits or mining rights to minerals.41
Introduction of the MPRDA also required a transition from the old order 
to the new mineral law regime in terms of transitional arrangements in 
Schedule II to the MPRDA (‘transitional arrangements’).42 The transitional 
arrangements were applicable to ‘old order rights’ (OORs) in respect of 
‘minerals’43 and were necessary to prevent the stultification and total disruption 
of an important sector of the economy until such time as existing operations 
33 See M O Dale, A Historical and Comparative Study of the Concept of Acquisition of Mineral 
Rights, LLD thesis, Pretoria: University of South Africa; P J Badenhorst and H Mostert, 
Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa (Jutas 2004) (Revision service 9), Chapter 1.
34 A mining authorisation took the form of either a mining permit or a mining licence.
35 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2012 (1) SA 171 (GNP), at [34]–[36].
36 See P Leon, ‘Creeping Expropriation of Mining Investments: an African Perspective’ 
(2009) 27 JERL 597, 614.
37 Holcim SA (Pty) Ltd v Prudent Investors (Pty) Ltd [2011] All SA 364 (SCA) 109, at [20].
38 This article will only focus on mineral resources.
39 MPRDA, s 3(1); De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Regional Manager, Mineral Regulation 
Free State Region: Department of Minerals and Energy (1590/2007) 2009 JDR 1314 (F) at 
[6]. See further Holcim SA (Pty) Ltd v Prudent Investors (Pty) Ltd [2011] All SA 364 (SCA) 
109, at [23]; Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) 
Ltd 2011 (4) SA 113 (CC), at [63]; P J Badenhorst, ‘Ownership of minerals in situ in 
South Africa: Australian darning to the rescue?’ (2010) 127(4) SALJ 646, 654–661.
40 See s 103(1) of the MPRDA and ‘Delegation of powers by the Minister of Minerals 
and Energy to officers in the Department of Minerals and Energy’, 12 May 2004 
(reproduced in Badenhorst and Mostert, n 33 above, at Related documents-33 to 
Related documents-36).
41 MPRDA, s 3(2)(a).
42 Some of the transitional arrangements in Sch II to the MPRDA (‘transitional 
arrangements’) have retrospectively been amended from 1 May 2004 by s 94(4) of 
the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Amendment Act, 49 of 2008. See 
further G Grobler, ‘Expropriation of mineral rights’, September 2009, De Rebus, at 23.
43 See the definition of a ‘mineral’ in s 1 of the MPRDA.
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could be regulated in terms of the MPRDA.44 This was achieved by continuing 
the existing rights in the form of OORs and affording their holders with an 
opportunity to apply for, or converting to, new prospecting or mining rights.45
What makes the MPRDA in the present context legally unique is that it 
constitutes mining legislation that was enacted in order to ‘achieve land, 
water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial 
discrimination’.46 On the one hand, the MPRDA has as its object promotion 
of equitable access to the nation’s mineral resources to all South Africans,47 
to expand opportunities and to secure benefits for historically disadvantaged 
persons in the mineral industry.48 On the other hand, it aims to provide for 
security of tenure in respect of prospecting and mining operations.49 
The transformative nature of the MPRDA has recently been emphasised 
by the Constitutional Court in Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and 
Energy.50 Chief Justice Mogoeng indicated that owing to the apartheid system, 
87 per cent of the land and mineral resources was placed in the hands of 
13 per cent of the population, namely white South Africans.51 Consequently, 
they wield ‘real economic power while the overwhelming majority of black 
South Africans are still identified with unemployment and abject poverty’.52 
Black South Africans were unable to benefit directly from the exploitation 
of mineral resources by reasons of their landlessness, exclusion and poverty. 
To address the gross economic inequality, the MPRDA was enacted to remedy 
the injustices of the past in the economic sector and facilitate equitable access 
to opportunities in the mining industry.53 The commitments in the preamble 
to the MPRDA to eradicate all forms of discrimination in the mining industry, 
and to take measures to address the skewed distribution of economic benefits 
during the apartheid era, were stated to ‘lie at the heart of the MPRDA’.54 
Mogoeng CJ concluded that the MPRDA ‘constitutes a break through the 
barriers of exclusivity to equal opportunity and to the commanding heights 
of wealth-generation, economic development and power’.55
One thus has to be mindful of the place of the MPRDA in the transformation 
landscape when aspects such as security of tenure are considered. 
44 Holcim SA (Pty) Ltd v Prudent Investors (Pty) Ltd [2011] All SA 364 (SCA) 109, at [26].
45 See Holcim SA (Pty) Ltd v Prudent Investors (Pty) Ltd [2011] All SA 364 (SCA) 109, at [26].
46 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s 25(8). 
47 MPRDA, s 2(c).
48 Ibid s 2(d).
49 Ibid s 2(g).
50 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC).
51 Ibid [1].
52 Ibid [1].
53 Ibid [1], [73]. 
54 Ibid [26].
55 Ibid [73].
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Meaning of security of mineral tenure
Security of tenure is a wide concept.56 Tenure of land is a notion of English 
land law. After the Norman Conquest in 1066, William the Conqueror 
granted land to his followers upon certain terms and conditions, which 
took the form of the rendering of different kinds of services to the Crown.57 
The types of services were ‘known as tenure, because it showed upon what 
terms the land was held (tenere, to hold)’.58 Tenure thus refers to the manner 
in which the law allows a person to hold land.59 Owing to statutory land 
reform in England, tenurial services and incidents of tenure disappeared 
over time.60 English law retains the basis today that all land is owned by the 
Crown, while the land is occupied by tenants holding it directly or indirectly 
of the Crown by virtue of the doctrine of tenures.61 The notion of ‘security 
of tenure’ probably developed in the context of English statutory provisions 
that were adopted during the 19th century to protect some tenants from 
their landlords. Protection was justified because of the assumed unequal 
bargaining positions of the parties.62 In the context of land, ‘security of 
tenure’ is defined as ‘the right of a tenant to continue to occupy a dwelling or 
site unless the landlord obtains a court order for possession of the property 
or termination of the tenancy agreement’.63 
Security of tenure has acquired a meaning in the context of prospecting 
and mining of minerals and is referred to as mineral tenure. Traditionally 
it had been defined as ‘a reasonable legal entitlement for extraction rights 
after successful completion of the exploration phase’.64 Security of mineral 
tenure, therefore, relates only to legal entitlement in the critical transition 
from the discovery of minerals to the mining of minerals.65
56 The notion of security of tenure may range from the conditions under which land 
or buildings are held or occupied, to the holding of an office by an elected person 
or the guaranteed permanent employment of academics (Oxford Dictionaries, http://
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/tenure).
57 See C Harpum, S Bridge and M Dixon, Megarry & Wade The Law of Real Property (8th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012), 2-002 (‘Megarry & Wade’); K Gray and S Gray, Elements of 
Land Law (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2009), 1.3.22.
58 Megarry & Wade, see n 57 above, 2-003; Gray and Gray, see n 57 above, 1.3.2.
59 Megarry & Wade, see n 57 above, 1-003.
60 For a useful summary of these reforms, see P Butt, Land Law (6th edn, Thomson 
Reuters 2010), 81–83.
61 Megarry & Wade, see n 57 above, 2-001, 2-006; Butt, see n 60 above, 83.
62 Megarry & Wade, n 57 above, 22-001.
63 Definition of ‘security of tenure’ in the Collins English Dictionary, www.collinsdictionary.
com/dictionary/english/security-of-tenure.
64 T Wälde, ‘Investment Policies and Investment Promotion in the Mineral Industries’ 
(1991) ICSID Foreign Investment Law Journal, 1 (Spring) 102.
65 Bastida, see n 31 above, 35.
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In a broader meaning, security of mineral tenure relates to the stability of 
rights granted to an investor to implement the three phases of the mining 
sequence, namely, exploration, development and mining.66 Thus, security 
of tenure not only comprises the critically important transition between 
discovery and mining but all the said phases.67 The timeline spans the 
period from the acquisition of prospecting rights or exploration rights to 
the entire duration of the productive life of a mine.68 The broad concept of 
security of tenure takes into account uncertainties involved in carrying out 
a mining project and the need to do it profitably.69 This concept has swung 
the pendulum towards the prospector or miner on the assumption that he 
is the best judge of mineral development.70
Criteria for security of mineral tenure
It is submitted that the following criteria can be taken into account to 
determine whether a mineral tenure is legally secure.
Nature of mineral tenure
The nature of mineral tenure has to be considered at the outset71 as that 
determines its enforceability. One has to ascertain whether mineral tenure is 
founded upon a personal right by virtue of a contract, an administrative grant 
or a real right (proprietary right), because the degree of security afforded 
will vary in each instance. A real right affords the best form of security of 
tenure. The legal nature of mineral tenure will also determine the extent 
of state intervention.72
Terms and conditions of mineral tenure
Terms and conditions of tenure play an important role73 as they provide an 
indication of the legal regime of tenure. The more onerous the terms and 
conditions of mineral tenure, the more difficult it may be to comply with 
66 J Otto, ‘Security of Mineral Tenure: Time-Limits’ in E Bastida, T Wälde and J Warden-
Fernandez (eds), International and Comparative Mineral Law and Policy (Kluwer 2005), 
353, 362.
67 Bastida, see n 31 above, 33, 36.
68 Ibid 36–37.
69 Ibid 32.
70 Ibid 38.
71 Ibid 39.
72 Ibid 35.
73 Ibid 36.
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the terms and conditions and the higher the risk of cancellation of mineral 
tenure due to non-compliance therewith. In other words, excessive regulation 
will impact on security of mineral tenure.74
Features of mineral tenure
In this regard, one has to ascertain whether mineral tenure is: 
• granted for a fixed term; 
• capable of registration; 
• alienable by sale, exchange, lease, sub-lease or otherwise; 
• transferable/capable of cession;75 
• capable of mortgage in order to raise funds;76 
• renewable; 
• convertible to new rights during periods of transition; and 
• capable of retention during unfavourable market conditions.77 
The presence of these features enhances security of mineral tenure. The 
limitation of timeframes for the state to approve the renewal or retention 
of a right also improves security of mineral tenure.78 The length of time 
allowed for exploration, development of a mine and completion of mining 
should be sufficient.79
Possibility of linkage or transition of mineral tenure
The three phases of the mining sequence have to be linked to afford security 
of mineral tenure.80 In other words, there should be continuity of mineral 
tenure during the life of a mine.81 Whether linkage or transition takes place 
as of right (automatically) or in accordance with sound administrative law 
principles has to be ascertained.82 If that is the case, it would fortify security 
of mineral tenure. The timeframe for the state to approve the granting of 
74 Ibid 37.
75 Ibid 33, 37; M O Dale, L Bekker, F J Bashall, M Chaskalson, C Dixon, G L Grobler 
and C D A Loxton, South African Mineral and Petroleum Law (Revision service 12) 
(Butterworths 2005), [Sch-28] (‘Dale et al’).
76 Bastida, see n 31 above, 37; Dale et al, see n 75 above, [Sch-28].
77 Ibid 38; Dale et al, see n 75 above, [Sch-28].
78 Bastida, see n 31 above, 37–38; Dale et al, see n 75 above, [Sch-28].
79 Bastida, see n 31 above, 37.
80 Ibid 33.
81 Dale et al, see n 75 above, [Sch-28].
82 See Bastida, n 31 above, 36; M O Dale, ‘Comparative International and African Mineral 
Law as Applied in the Formation of the New South African Mineral Development 
Legislation’ in E Bastida, T Wälde and J Warden-Fernandez (eds), International and 
Comparative Mineral Law and Policy (Kluwer 2005), 825.
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the next right also impacts on security of mineral tenure.83 A short term 
enhances security of tenure.
Grounds for cancellation of mineral tenure
One has to determine upon what grounds mineral tenure can be cancelled 
because a multiple or a wide range of grounds may detract from security of 
mineral tenure.
Grounds for termination of mineral tenure
One has to determine whether mineral tenure will be terminated upon 
objective grounds or by expropriation, as these forms of termination detract 
from security of mineral tenure.84
Degree of discretion involved in decision-making
The discretion exercised by the state upon the granting, conversion, 
transition or termination of mineral tenure or exercise of rights by virtue 
of mineral tenure is of vital importance in the determination of security of 
mineral tenure.85 Limitation of discretion in the above instance enhances 
security of tenure.86
Right to judicial appeal or arbitration
It is important for purposes of security of tenure to determine whether there 
is a possibility of appealing against a decision of an official that may impact 
on security of tenure87 or whether alternative dispute resolution is possible 
for issues of tenure.88
Guarantee against expropriation of mineral tenure
One has to determine whether a guarantee against expropriation exists in 
the particular mining statute, another statute, the Constitution or treaties, 
as such guarantees enhance the security of mineral tenure.89
83 Bastida, see n 31 above, 37–38.
84 Ibid 33.
85 See Bastida, n 31 above, 37.
86 Dale et al, see n 75 above, [Sch-28].
87 Dale, see n 82 above, 825.
88 Dale et al, see n 75 above, [Sch-28].
89 See Bastida, n 31 above, 34, 37.
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Payment of compensation upon loss of mineral tenure
The right to claim payment of compensation on the termination or 
expropriation of mineral tenure is an important consideration.90 One has 
to determine the legal source of such compensation, because it constitutes 
a substitute for the loss of mineral tenure. The greater the compensation 
payable upon loss of tenure, the more the security of tenure increases, while 
the absence of compensation weighs heavily against security of tenure.
Summary
The above criteria are not a closed list and overlapping may occur among 
them. It will be argued in the commentary that security of mineral tenure 
is also dependent on the way in which the MPRDA is administered by the 
Department of Mineral Resources (the ‘Department’). In addition, the 
interpretation of the provisions of the MPRDA by the courts as well as external 
factors such as maintenance of infrastructure, supply of water and electricity 
for mining, social conditions, employment and political stability can affect 
security of mineral tenure.
Security of mineral tenure and the MPRDA
The extent of security of tenure provided for by the MPRDA can be examined 
in the instances of current prospecting and mining rights that have been 
granted in terms of the MPRDA and the OORs that continued to exist during 
the different periods of the transitional arrangements. 
Security of mineral tenure of prospecting and mining rights
The prima facie answer to the question of whether holders of rights to 
minerals have security of tenure is in the affirmative, insofar as the MPRDA 
has as one of its objectives to provide for security of tenure in respect of 
‘prospecting and mining operations’.91 It is, therefore, a task or duty of the 
state as custodian of mineral resources to do so. Prospecting rights, mining 
permits and mining rights apply to such operations and are acquired and 
exercised in terms of the provisions of Chapter 4 of the MPRDA. The main 
focus of the discussion is on the security of tenure for holders of prospecting 
rights and mining rights. To the extent that retention permits form part 
90 Dale, see n 82 above, 825.
91 MPRDA, s 2(g).
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of the linkage of prospecting and mining rights, these rights are also 
discussed. In addition, the security of tenure of mortgagees (if such rights 
were encumbered by a mortgage bond) is explored in this article. Other 
rights to minerals such as reconnaissance permissions and mining permits 
are dealt with to highlight the features of security of tenure for prospecting 
rights and mining rights.
If viewed against the criteria for security of tenure stated above, the 
following appears.
NaturE of prospEctiNg aNd miNiNg rights
A prospecting right or mining right granted in terms of the MPRDA and 
registered at the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office (MPTRO) 
is labelled as a ‘limited real right in respect of the mineral’.92 It is compulsory 
to lodge the prospecting right93 or mining right94 for registration with the 
MPTRO within 60 days of its execution. Upon registration of such right in 
terms of the Mining Titles Registration Act, 16 of 1967 (MTRA), it is said to 
‘constitute a limited real right binding on third parties’.95
Upon the execution of a prospecting right or mining right, contractual 
rights are created between the state and the grantee,96 while upon registration 
of the prospecting right or mining right, a limited real right is created.97 
Support for the view that, upon the grant of prospecting rights or mining 
rights, contractual rights are created can be found in Meepo v Kotze.98 
Prospecting and mining rights that are contractual (upon execution) and 
real in nature (upon registration) provide more security of tenure than 
prospecting or mining permits and licences that are granted administratively 
or just by contract. Registration of these rights also provides the benefits 
afforded by a system of registration of rights.99
Reconnaissance permissions, retention permits and mining permits are 
not registrable in the MPTRO.100 Such permissions or permits are personal 
in nature101 and, accordingly, afford lesser security of tenure.
92 Ibid s 5(1). See further P J Badenhorst, ‘Nature of New Order Rights to Minerals: a 
Rubikian Exercise since Passing the Mayday Rubicon with a Cubic Circonium’ (2005) 
26 Obiter 505.
93 MPRDA, ss 19(2)(a) and 17(5) and definition of effective date in s 1.
94 Ibid ss 25(2)(a) and 23(5) and definition of effective date in s 1.
95 Mining Titles Registration Act 16 of 1967, s 2(4).
96 See Badenhorst and Mostert, n 33 above, 13–21.
97 Ibid 13–22.
98 2008 (1) SA 104 (NC), [46.3].
99 See Dale, n 82 above, 829.
100 The Director-General is only empowered to record and file these permits in terms of 
s 5(1)(v) of the Mining Titles Registration Act.
101 See Badenhorst and Mostert, n 33 above, 13–20J; Dale, n 82 above, 830.
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tErms aNd coNditioNs of prospEctiNg aNd miNiNg rights
The terms and conditions of a prospecting and mining right are left to 
administrative discretion.102 Negotiations as to the terms and conditions to 
be embodied in the prospecting and mining right, however, do take place.103
fEaturEs of prospEctiNg aNd miNiNg rights
Prospecting and mining rights are: 
(a) granted for a fixed period;104 
(b) capable of registration;105 
(c) alienable by sale, assignment, disposal, exchange, lease or sub-lease; 
(d) capable of cession or transfer;106 
(e) capable of mortgage;107 
(f) renewable;108 and 
(g) capable of retention.109
Mining rights are not granted in perpetuity or for the life of a mine, which 
detracts from security of tenure.110 Cession/transfer and mortgage of leases 
and sub-leases of prospecting or mining rights are also possible. Ministerial 
consent is required in legal acts (c)–(d) and cessions/transfers of leases and 
sub-leases.111 The prohibition applies to prospecting or mining rights, a share 
in such rights or a controlling interest in a company holding prospecting or 
mining rights.112 Ministerial consent has to be given if the transferee, lessee, 
sub-lessee or cessionary is capable of complying with the conditions of the 
right and satisfies the requirements of a new applicant for such right.113 
Ministerial consent is, however, not required in the case of a change in the 
102 MPRDA, ss 17(6) and 23(6); Dale, see n 82 above, 835.
103 Ibid 828.
104 A prospecting right or mining right is granted for a maximum period of five years or 
30 years, respectively.
105 Even though it is due to compulsory registration.
106 MPRDA, s 11(1). Contractual rights are transferred by cession, while real (property) 
rights are conveyed by transfer.
107 Ibid s 11(3).
108 Ibid ss 19(1)(a) and 25(1).
109 Ibid s 32.
110 Dale, see n 82 above, 850.
111 MPRDA, s 11(1).
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid s 11(2); Dale, see n 82 above, 830.
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controlling interest of a listed company.114 The prohibition in a proposed 
new section 11(1)115 would cover the legal acts in respect of prospecting 
or mining rights,116 any interest in an unlisted company or any controlling 
interest in a listed company holding the prospecting or mining right. 
Ministerial consent will, thus, have to be obtained for the sale of any shares 
in an unlisted company holding a prospecting or mining right and would 
impact severely on transferability of rights. The consequences of requiring 
Ministerial consent for such legal acts in respect of the interests in companies 
listed on the stock exchange that hold prospecting or mining rights are too 
ghastly to contemplate, and would spell disaster for security of tenure, foreign 
investment and the normal functioning of the stock exchange. It is hoped 
that common sense would prevail in the enactment of an amended section 
11(1). Ministerial consent is also not required for the mortgaging of such 
rights by a bank or financial institution to finance a prospecting or mining 
project.117 Bonds not for project financing, or in favour of a mortgagee that 
is not a bank or financial institution, will require Ministerial consent.118 
Transfers and mortgaging of prospecting and mining rights, or cessions 
or mortgaging of leases or sub-leases, have to be lodged for registration in 
the MPTRO within 60 days of such legal act119 and are, thus, registrable as 
such. A prospecting right may be renewed once for a period not exceeding 
three years.120 A mining right may be renewed for further periods, each of 
which may not exceed 30 years at a time.121 A holder of a prospecting right 
may obtain a retention permit to suspend the terms and conditions of the 
prospecting right during unfavourable market conditions.122
As indicated above, provision is not made for the registration of mining 
permits, reconnaissance permissions and retention permits. A mining 
permit,123 reconnaissance permission or retention permit124 is inalienable. A 
mining permit may be mortgaged with Ministerial consent only for purposes 
114 Ibid s 11(1). As to the meaning of a ‘controlling interest’, see Mogale Alloys (Pty) Ltd v 
Nuco Chrome Boputhatswana (Pty) Ltd 2011 (6) SA 96 (GSJ) at [37], [38]; P J Badenhorst 
and J J Du Plessis, ‘Alienation or disposal of a “controlling interest” in a prospecting 
company’ (2012) 45 De Jure 388.
115 The author has used the most recent attempt by the legislature in s 8 of the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Bill 2013. Section 11(1) was earlier amended 
by Act 49 of 2008, which amendment will only come into operation by proclamation. 
116 Or an interest (aliquot share) in such rights.
117 MPRDA, s 11(3).
118 Dale, see n 72 above, 831.
119 MPRDA, s 11(4).
120 Ibid s 18(4).
121 Ibid s 24(4).
122 See further MPRDA, s 32.
123 Ibid s 27(8)(b).
124 Ibid ss 14(5), 36.
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of financing a mining project.125 A reconnaissance permission or retention 
permit cannot be mortgaged.126 While a mining permit or a retention 
permit is renewable,127 a reconnaissance permission is not.128 Compared with 
prospecting or mining rights, mining permits, reconnaissance permissions 
and retention permits afford less security of tenure. The limited features of a 
retention permit are only relevant to the extent that it forms a link between 
prospecting and mining.
possibility of liNkagE or traNsitioN of prospEctiNg aNd miNiNg rights
Linkage or continuity is provided between: (a) a prospecting right and 
a retention permit or a mining right; and (b) a retention permit and a 
mining right.129 The holder of a prospecting right has the exclusive right 
to apply for and be granted a mining right in respect of the mineral 
and prospecting area.130 A holder of a prospecting right may apply for 
a retention permit to suspend prospecting operations.131 The holder of 
a retention permit has the exclusive right to apply for and be granted a 
mining right in respect of the mineral and retention area.132 Continuity 
of tenure is assured by provisions that an application for a right by a new 
applicant will not be accepted if another person already holds a right 
to the relevant mineral133 or a prior application has been accepted (for 
consideration) but not yet been granted or refused.134 As we have seen, 
prospecting rights and mining rights are renewable. Continuity is achieved 
during lodgment of an application for renewal of a prospecting right or 
mining right in that the right remains in force until the application has 
been granted or refused.135
A holder of a reconnaissance permission does not have an exclusive 
right to apply for or be granted a prospecting right, mining right or mining 
permit.136 Linkage is thus absent.
125 Ibid s 27(8)(b).
126 Ibid ss 14(5),36.
127 Ibid ss 27(8)(a) and 34(3).
128 Ibid ss 14(4).
129 Dale, see n 82 above, 836.
130 MPRDA, s 19(1)(b).
131 Ibid s 31(1).
132 Ibid s 35(1).
133 Ibid ss 13(2)(b); 16(2)(b); 22(2)(b); 27(3)(b).
134 Ibid ss 16(2)(c) and 22(2)(c); Dale, see n 82 above, 836.
135 Ibid ss 18(5) and 24(5); Dale, see n 82 above, 836.
136 Ibid s 15(2)(b).
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grouNds for caNcEllatioN of prospEctiNg aNd miNiNg rights
The Minister may cancel or suspend a prospecting right, retention permit, 
mining permit or mining right on specified grounds. Suspension of 
cancellation of the right or permit can take place if its holder: 
(a) is conducting prospecting or mining operations in contravention of 
the provisions of the MPRDA; 
(b) breaches any material term or condition of the right or permit; 
(c) is contravening the approved environmental management plan or 
programme; or 
(d) has submitted incorrect or misleading information.137 
The MPRDA requires that notice be given and reasons supplied to a holder, 
and the holder afforded an opportunity to respond before a right or permit 
may be cancelled or suspended.138 To protect the security interest of a 
mortgagee, notice must also be given to the mortgagee if the prospecting 
right, mining permit or mining right is subject to a mortgage.139 The 
Minister must also direct the holder to take specified remedial measures.140 
Upon non-compliance with the directive, the Minister must afford the 
holder a reasonable opportunity to make representations and consider 
the representation before the Minister may suspend or cancel the right or 
permit.141 A suspension of a right or permit may also be lifted in certain 
circumstances.142 The provisions for suspension or cancellation of rights 
conform to international standards of specified criteria for suspension 
and cancellation of rights, notice and affording an opportunity to remedy 
non-compliance.143
grouNds for tErmiNatioN of prospEctiNg aNd miNiNg rights
A prospecting right, retention permit, mining permit or mining 
right is terminated upon expiry,144 cancellation,145 abandonment146 or 
expropriation.147 Termination also takes place upon the death of a holder 
137 Ibid s 47(1).
138 See further s 47(2)(a)–(c) of the MPRDA.
139 See s 47(2)(d) of the MPRDA.
140 MPRDA, s 47(3).
141 Ibid s 47(4).
142 See s 47(5) of the MPRDA.
143 Dale, see n 82 above, 837.
144 Ibid s 56(a).
145 Ibid s 56(e).
146 Ibid s 56(f).
147 Ibid s 55(1); Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, s 12.
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with no successors-in-title148 or sequestration of a holder,149 if the holder is a 
natural person. Termination takes place upon deregistration and failure to 
apply for Ministerial consent for the transfer of rights150 or the liquidation151 
of a holder, if the holder is a company.
dEgrEE of discrEtioN iNvolvEd iN dEcisioN-makiNg
Mining rights, prospecting rights and mining permits are granted, renewed 
or cancelled administratively152 by the Minister or a delegate of the Minister.153 
An administrative decision must be: (a) in writing; (b) accompanied by written 
reasons;154 (c) taken within a reasonable time; and (d) in accordance with the 
principles of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness.155 Prescribed 
requirements must be met before a right is granted156 or transferred.157 The 
discretion to be exercised by the Minister or delegate to grant rights has 
been labelled as open-ended158 because vague notions159 must be taken into 
account in the decision-making process. The broad discretion detracts from 
security of tenure even though sound administrative law provisions exist.
right to judicial appEal or arbitratioN
Provision is made for an internal appeal against an administrative decision 
of the regional manager or an officer of the Department to the Director-
General or an internal appeal against the administrative decision of the 
Director-General to the Minister.160 Upon refusal of the grant of a prospecting 
right by the Deputy Director-General (delegate of the Minister) an internal 
148 Ibid s 56(b).
149 Ibid s 56(d).
150 Ibid s 56(c).
151 Ibid s 56(d).
152 Dale, see n 82 above, 828.
153 The Minister has delegated the power to grant or renew prospecting rights or mining 
permits (see n 40 above).
154 MPRDA, s 6(2).
155 Ibid s 6(1). Any decision is subject to the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act, 3 of 2000.
156 Ibid ss 16(1) and (2) and 17(1) and (2) (prospecting right), ss 22(1) and (2) and 23(1) 
(mining right).
157 See MPRDA, s 11(2).
158 Dale, see n 82 above, 834.
159 For instance, whether granting will result in: (a) concentration of mineral resources 
under control of applicant; (b) expansion of opportunities for historically 
disadvantaged persons; and (c) local beneficiation.
160 MPRDA, s 96(1).
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appeal by the applicant to the Minister was held to be permissible.161 There 
is no provision for recourse to arbitration.
guaraNtEE agaiNst ExpropriatioN of prospEctiNg rights aNd 
miNiNg rights
Prospecting rights, mining permits and mining rights constitute ‘property’ 
(‘constitutional property’) for the purposes of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996162 (the ‘Constitution’) 
and can, in terms of section 25(2), only be expropriated:
1. in terms of law of general application; 
2. for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
3. subject to the payment of compensation.163 
A guarantee against expropriation can, in addition, be provided by treaty.164
paymENt of compENsatioN for loss of prospEctiNg aNd miNiNg rights
Provision is not made for compensation upon termination of a prospecting 
right or mining right, except in the case of expropriation of such right in 
order to achieve the objectives of the MPRDA.165
In Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy166 Mogoeng CJ was of the 
view that holders of prospecting permits and mining authorisations under the 
now-repealed Minerals Act (old order) did not really have security of tenure. 
Under the old order, a prospecting permit was granted for 12 months,167 while 
a mining authorisation was granted for a period that was at the discretion of 
161 Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tropical Paradise 427 
(Pty) Ltd) [2010] 3 All SA 577 (SCA), at [21]; Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah 
Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 113 (CC), at [44]–[52], [54].
162 Badenhorst and Mostert, see n 33 above, 25–35 fn 10. Section 25 of the Constitution 
of the RSA does not define property, other than stating that it is not limited to land. 
Ownership of corporeal things and other real rights constitute constitutional property 
(National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC), at [61]).
163 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC), at [67]. 
Determination of compensation takes place in terms of s 25(3) of the Constitution and 
the expropriation Act. See further P J Badenhorst, J M Pienaar, H Mostert, Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s Law of Property (5th edn, Butterworths 2006), 522 et seq.
164 See, for instance, para 5(1) of the Agreement Between the UK and South African 
Governments as cited in J D van der Vyver, ‘Nationalisation of mineral rights in South 
Africa’ (2012) 45 De Jure 126, 139.
165 MPRDA, s 55(1).
166 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC), at [66] and note 93.
167 Minerals Act, s 6(4).
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the Director: Mining Development.168 Under the MPRDA, the period for a 
prospecting permit or a mining permit is five years169 or 30 years,170 respectively.171 
This may create the impression that the MPRDA affords better security of tenure 
than the dispensation of the old order. Insofar as the respective periods for the 
exercise of rights are concerned, Mogoeng CJ is correct. Under the old order, 
prospecting permits and mining authorisations were statutory permissions to 
exercise prospecting rights or mining rights upon compliance with certain 
prescribed requirements.172 If the periods of the duration of the common 
law rights per se of the old order are compared with the statutory periods of 
prospecting and mining rights (as real rights) granted in terms of the MPRDA, 
it becomes clear that the new dispensation offers less security of tenure. Mineral 
rights were privately held and perpetual in duration,173 while prospecting and 
mining rights were granted by the holders of mineral rights to prospectors and 
miners for a mutually agreed period of time.174 Registered mineral rights175 
provided the best form of security of tenure176 and could only be terminated upon 
expropriation against payment of compensation.177 Prospecting and mining 
rights could also be registered,178 were secure and could be enforced against 
the holder of mineral rights in contract and property law. A (registrable) right 
to prospect or a right to mine under the MPRDA only exist for the period of 
the statutory grant or until terminated in terms of the MPRDA. Such forms of 
termination did not exist under the old order. Due to this fundamental shift in 
the MPRDA from privately owned mineral rights to publicly owned minerals,179 
the granting of rights to applicants for a period of time by the state and the 
possibility of termination or cancellation of such rights by the state, security of 
tenure became an issue and had to be provided for in the MPRDA. Enforcement 
168 Ibid s 9(1).
169 MPRDA, s 17(6).
170 Ibid s 23(6).
171 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC), at [66] and note 93.
172 See Minerals Act, ss 6(2) and 9(3).
173 See Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy; Van Rooyen v Minister of Minerals 
and Energy 2010 (1) SA 104 (GNP), at [9].
174 The period could have been for the duration of the mine or indefinitely (Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue v De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd 1943 GWLD 21 32; B L S Franklin 
and M Kaplan, The Mining and Mineral Laws of South Africa (Butterworths 1982), 612.
175 Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937, s 3(1)(m).
176 Dale, see n 31 above, 301, 308. Dale 301–303 clearly shows that the common law 
mineral system as preserved by the Minerals Act offered more security of tenure than a 
state-orientated mining law system. 
177 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC), at [41], [43] and 
[46]; see also De Villiers v Stadsraad van Mamelodi 1995 4 SA 347 (T); P J Badenhorst and 
E Van der Vyver, ‘Mineraalregte as voorwerp van onteiening’ 1996 TSAR 800.
178 Deeds Registries Act, s 3(1)(p), (q) and (m).
179 MRDA, s 3(1); see further Badenhorst, n 39 above, 646.
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of prospecting or mining rights under the MPRDA has to take place against 
the state in contract and administrative law, and not within the secure realm of 
property law.
Security of mineral tenure afforded to OORs
The transitional provisions provided for the transition from the old order to 
the new order. A distinction may be drawn between (a) the conversions of 
old order prospecting or mining rights (OOPMRs)180 into new prospecting 
or mining rights, and (b) the application anew for prospecting rights or 
mining rights by holders of unused old order rights (UOORs).181 In the first 
instance, prospecting or mining operations were conducted immediately 
before the MPRDA took effect on 1 May 2004182 while, in the second instance, 
such operations did not take place.183 A distinction can, accordingly, be 
drawn between OOPMRs on the one hand, and UOORs on the other. The 
first instance involves a conversion mechanism, while the second involves 
an application mechanism.184
OOPMRs
Security of tenure was important during the respective interim periods 
of OOPMRs185 as well as upon conversion of the respective rights to new 
prospecting and mining rights.
(a) During the period of transition, the OOPMRs were recognised as new 
statutory rights186 comprising the underlying common law mineral 
right, prospecting rights (by virtue of prospecting contract) or mining 
rights (by virtue of a mineral lease) or statutory prospecting or mining 
rights (granted in terms of prior existing legislation) and prospecting 
180 In terms of items 6 and 7 of the transitional arrangements, respectively.
181 In terms of item 8 of the transitional arrangements and Chapter 4 of the MPRDA.
182 See the definitions of an ‘old order prospecting right’ and ‘old order mining right’ in 
item 1 of the transitional arrangements.
183 See the definition of ‘unused old order rights’ in item 1 of the transitional 
arrangements. The applications in terms of the provision of Chapter 4 of the MPRDA 
are new applications.
184 Dale et al, see n 75 above, [SchII-37].
185 Two years (old order prospecting right) and five years or a shorter grant period 
(old order mining right).
186 Minister of Mineral Resources of the RSA v Sishen Iron Ore (394/12) [2013] ZASCA 50  
(28 March 2013), at [27(d)]. See P J Badenhorst, ‘The make-up of transitional rights 
to minerals: Something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue …?’ 
(2011) SALJ 763, 767–772, 783.
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permits or mining authorisations in terms of the Minerals Act.187 
Some of the constituent elements of OOPMRs, such as the common 
law mineral right and mining rights, were real in nature.188 Prior to 
the MPRDA, prospecting permits and mining authorisations were 
statutory permissions to exercise prospecting rights or mining rights. 
State intervention was thus limited to regulating the exercise of mineral 
rights, prospecting and mining rights.189 The terms and conditions of 
prospecting contracts and mineral leases were determined by private 
negotiations between holders of mineral rights and prospectors or 
miners. The length of time required for prospecting or mining was also 
determined by private negotiations, while the exercise of these rights 
was affected by the timeframes determined for prospecting permits or 
mining authorisations.190 Prospecting contracts and mineral leases were 
capable of registration,191 transferable192 and renewable if provided for 
in the agreement.193 Mineral leases were capable of mortgage in order 
to raise funds194 and capable of sub-lease.195 Prospecting permits and 
mining authorisations were, however, not transferable.196
 During the respective periods of transition, some security of tenure for 
holders of existing OOPMRs was achieved because existing OOPMRs 
continued in force subject to their terms and conditions197 for the 
respective interim periods.198 The new statutory prospecting or mining 
rights embodied the rights previously enjoyed under the OOR, except 
for the entitlement to transfer the right to a third party.199 The new 
statutory right also included the entitlement to apply for the conversion 
187 See Holcim SA (Pty) Ltd v Prudent Investors (Pty) Ltd [2011] 1 All SA 364 (SCA), at [14]; 
Minister of Mineral Resources of the RSA v Sishen Iron Ore (394/12) [2013] ZASCA 50  
(28 March 2013), at [28].
188 See Badenhorst, n 186 above, 783. As to the real nature of these former rights, see 
Badenhorst, n 186 above, 767.
189 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC), at para 35.
190 Minerals Act, ss 6(4), 9(1), 11(1).
191 Deeds Registries Act, ss 3(1)(q) and 3(1)(m) and s 77(1).
192 See ss 3(1)(q), 3(1)(m) and s 77 of the Deeds Registries Act.
193 M J Lowe , M O Dale, A De Kock, S L Froneman and A J G Lang, Elliot: The South 
African Notary (6th edn, 1987), 218 (‘Lowe et al’); see further s 84 of the Deeds 
Registries Act.
194 Deeds Registries Act, s 81; Lowe et al, see n 193 above, 157.
195 Deeds Registries Act, ss 3(1)(m) and 77.
196 Minerals Act, s 13.
197 Items 6(1) and 7(1) of the transitional arrangements.
198 See item 6(8) and 7(8) of the transitional arrangements.
199 Minister of Mineral Resources of the RSA v Sishen Iron Ore (394/12) 2013 ZASCA 50  
(28 March 2013), at [27(g)].
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of the right into a prospecting right or mining right.200 The continued 
validity during the interim periods of prospecting permits or mining 
authorisations meant prospecting or mining (and even open-cast 
mining) could take place.201 The transitional provisions had as their 
objective the avoidance of the disruption of existing prospecting and 
mining operations202 and achieving ‘the seamless continuation’ of 
existing prospecting and mining operations.203 Security of tenure was, 
however, not enhanced by the shortening of the unexpired periods of 
the OOPMRs to two years or five years, respectively, by the transitional 
arrangements.204 The imposition of a duty on such holders to apply for 
conversion of their respective rights during transition205 and registration 
thereof in the MPTRO206 provided for the possibility of conversion of 
their respective rights. If the specific requirements for conversion had 
been met, the Minister had to convert the OOPMRs.207 Lodgment for 
registration had to take place within 90 days from the receipt of notice 
of conversion.208 Deregistration of the OOR also had to take place at that 
time.209 Upon conversion of the respective rights and the registration in 
the MPTRO of the prospecting right210 or mining right211 into which it 
was converted, the OOR to minerals ceased to exist. If the requirements 
for conversion of an old order mining right had not been met, the 
applicant could have been requested to comply within 60 days of such 
request.212 Upon failure to comply with the request, the Minister had 
to refuse to convert the right and notify the applicant within 30 days 
of the decision and reason for it.213 Upon refusal by the Minister, the 
200 Minister of Mineral Resources of the RSA v Sishen Iron Ore (394/12) [2013] ZASCA 50  
(28 March 2013), at [27(d)].
201 See Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA).
202 See n 200, above at [27(c)].
203 Ibid, at [27(e)].
204 Dale et al, see n 75 above, [SchII-35].
205 See items 6(2) and 7(2) of the transitional arrangements.
206 Ibid items 6(5) and 7(5).
207 Ibid items 6(3) and 7(3).
208 Ibid items 6(5) and 7(5).
209 Ibid items 6(5) and 7(5).
210 Ibid item 6(7).
211 Ibid item 7(7).
212 Ibid item 7(3A). This provision was added on 7 June 2013 by Act 49 of 2008, long after 
the expiry of the different periods of transition.
213 Ibid item 7(3B). This provision was added on 7 June 2013 by Act 49 of 2008, long 
after the expiry of the periods of transition. See Sishen Iron Ore Company (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Mineral Resources (unreported decision) Case no 28980/10, 3 February 2012 
(28980/10) (NGD), at [89] where the same was stated as to the law prior to insertion 
of this provision.
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OOR is terminated. If the holder failed to lodge the transitional right 
for conversion before the expiry of the respective interim period, the 
transitional right ceased to exist.214 Termination of transitional rights 
are, by nature, contrary to security of tenure and are ameliorated by 
a transitional process and proposed payment of compensation upon 
expropriation of OORs.215
 Security of tenure was also provided to mortgagees of OOPMRs during 
the respective transition periods because, by implication, the OOPMRs 
remained subject to the mortgage during the period of transition.216 
The object of security, however, was not executable as OOPMRs were 
no longer transferable to third parties.217
(b) Upon conversion of an OOPMR, the holder became the holder of 
a prospecting right or mining right under the MPRDA with all the 
advantages flowing from such a right.218 The transitional provisions 
were aimed to afford holders of OORs the opportunity to apply for new 
rights219 and to protect the security of tenure of holders of OOPMRs.220
 As to the conversion mechanism provided for in the transitional 
arrangements, Dale et al argue convincingly that the legislature achieved 
a high degree of security of tenure. They indicated that: 
• the mechanism is indeed a conversion process221 because the old right 
is simply converted into another right;222 
• the MPRDA did not sanction the negotiation or execution of new 
rights;223 
• consultation with and objections by third parties to the granting of 
the converted rights were limited to listed criteria;224 
• a seamless link was created between the terms and conditions of the 
214 Items 6(8) and 7(8) of the transitional arrangements, respectively.
215 See Dale, n 82 above, 843.
216 Items 6(6) and 7(6) of the transitional arrangements provide for registration of the 
converted right subject to the (old) mortgage.
217 Minister of Mineral Resources of the RSA v Sishen Iron Ore (394/12) [2013] ZASCA 50 (28 
March 2013), at [27(g)].
218 Ibid. The mining houses initially insisted that the new rights should be granted in 
perpetuity and free from ministerial discretion (see Capps, n 30 above, 325).
219 See item 2(b) of the transitional arrangements.
220 Ibid item 2(a).
221 Dale et al, n 75 above, [SchII-29].
222 Dale et al, see n 75 above, [SchII-28] to [SchII-29]; see also Dale, n 82 above, 843.
223 Dale et al, see n 75 above, [SchII-29].
224 Items 6(3) and 7(3) of the transitional arrangements; Dale et al, see n 75 above, 
[SchII-29] to [SchII-30].
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old right and the converted right;225 
• OOPMRs remained in force upon lodgment for conversion until 
conversion and registration of the converted right;226 
• only an undertaking to comply (and not compliance) with new black 
economic empowerment provisions were required;227 and 
• the Minister lacked the power to refuse the conversion.228 
Dale et al, however, indicate the security of tenure was not fully protected 
by the conversion mechanism because: (a) it does not deem to convert 
OOPMRs and does not operate automatically;229 and (b) the terms of 
OOPMRs that are contrary to the provisions of the MPRDA or Constitution 
are unenforceable.230 As seen before,231 upon failure of an applicant to 
comply with a Ministerial request, the Minister could refuse the conversion 
of the OOPMRs.
Upon conversion of rights, security of tenure was also provided to 
mortgagees of old order prospecting rights or mining rights because 
converted prospecting or mining rights must be registered in the MPTRO 
subject to such mortgages.232 This is referred to as transposition of existing 
mortgages over OOPMRs to new prospecting or mining rights.233
Continuity of OOPMRs (after conversion) in the sense of progression 
from prospecting to retention or mining and retention to mining is secured, 
despite the fact that these progressions are not automatic.234 The grounds 
for cancellation of converted prospecting rights or mining rights or the 
grounds for termination of these rights would be the same as for prospecting 
or mining rights granted anew, and have been discussed before.235
Even though conversion is very close to an automatic conversion, ‘the 
225 Ibid items 6(3) and 7(3); Minister of Mineral Resources of the RSA v Sishen Iron Ore 
(394/12) [2013] ZASCA 50 (28 March 2013), at [27(e)], [29]; Dale et al, see n 75 
above, [SchII-30].
226 Ibid items 6(7) and 7(7) read with items 6(8) and 7(8), respectively; Dale, see n 82 
above, 845; Dale et al, see n 75 above, [SchII-30].
227 Ibid item 7(2)(k); Dale, see n 75 above, [SchII-30].
228 Dale et al, see n 65 above, [SchII-33]. Dale stated this prior to insertion of item 7(3B) 
by Act 49 of 2008. See n 213 above.
229 Dale et al, see n 75 above, [SchII-35]. An administrative decision-making process is 
required in relation to some of the items that are to be lodged for conversion (Dale 
et al, n 75 above, [SchII-35]). The mining houses initially insisted on automatic 
conversion of rights (Capps, see n 30 above, 325).
230 Dale et al, see n 75 above, [SchII-35].
231 See OOPMRs (a) above.
232 Item 6(6) and 7(6) of the transitional arrangements; Dale, see n 82 above, 845.
233 Dale, see n 82 above, 845.
234 Ibid, 836; Dale et al, see n 75 above, [SchII-31] to [SchII-31].
235 See ‘Grounds for cancellation of prospecting and mining rights and grounds for 
termination of prospecting and mining rights’ above, 21–22.
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process provides for an objectively-defined decision-making process which 
allows very little discretion to the Minister’.236 The Minister’s view on 
conversion can be challenged and tested objectively in a review237 by a court 
of law.238 The absence of (i) judicial appeal in the MPRDA against the refusal 
of an application for conversion of OOPMRs, or (ii) recourse to international 
arbitration239 has a negative impact on security of mineral tenure.
OOPMRs constituted constitutional property.240 What has been 
stated about the protection of prospecting rights and mining rights as 
constitutional property applies here as well.241 In addition, item 12 of the 
transitional arrangements provides that compensation can be claimed from 
the state if a claimant can prove that expropriation of property in terms of 
the provisions of the MPRDA has taken place. In Agri South Africa v Minister 
of Minerals and Energy242 it was decided that, in the case of common law 
mineral rights (underlying an UOOR) that were held by a holder who did 
not apply for a new right, such mineral right had been expropriated by 
the enactment of the MPRDA. However, on appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri SA243 it was decided that 
all mineral rights that had existed in South Africa under the Minerals 
Act were not expropriated under the MPRDA owing to the absence of a 
deprivation of property by the state because the right to mine was never 
vested in holders of mineral rights but rather the state.244 The court also 
found that acquisition of rights by the state did not take place.245 It should 
be remembered that the decision dealt with holders of UOORs who did not 
apply for new prospecting or mining rights. The court stated obiter 246 that 
holders of OOPMRs who applied for conversion of their rights were not 
deprived of the right to (prospect) or mine because of the continuation of 
their (prospecting) or mining activities upon conversion and the similar 
content of the present rights and previous rights.247 Both deprivation of 
236 Dale et al, see n 75 above, [SchII-27]. See also Dale, n 82 above, 849.
237 Ibid, [SchII 33] to [SchII-34].
238 Ibid, [SchII-31] to [SchII-32].
239 Dale, see n 82 above, 836, 850; Dale et al, see n 75 above, [SchII-34].
240 See n 162 above.
241 See ‘Guarantee against expropriation of prospecting and mining rights above’.
242 2012 (1) SA 171 (GNP), at [88]; See P J Badenhorst and N J J Olivier, ‘Expropriation of 
“unused old order rights” by the MPRDA: you have lost it! Agri SA v Minister of Minerals 
and Energy’ (2012) 75 THRHR 329; P J Badenhorst, ‘Large scale Expropriation of 
Mineral Rights in South Africa: The Agri South Africa saga’ (2011) 30(3) ARELJ 261.
243 2012 (5) SA 1 (SCA), at [99].
244 Ibid at [85].
245 Ibid at [90], [94].
246 Ibid at [103].
247 Ibid at [89] to [90].
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property and acquisition of property by the state were found to be absent.248 
Upon failure to convert such rights, the court held that ‘it is the absence 
of the rights themselves, rather than the absence of transmissibility, that 
is the source of loss’.249 The correctness of this decision by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal has been questioned.250 The subsequent decision of the 
Constitutional Court in Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 251 
is discussed below, as the court correctly decided the expropriation issue 
with reference to UOORs.
UOORs
(a) During the period of transition252 the UOORs were construed as 
creatures of statute. What has been stated about the nature of OOPMRs 
applies to UOORs. As stated before,253 the underlying mineral rights 
had the feature that they existed in perpetuity.
 During the period of transition, security of mineral tenure for holders 
of UOORs was achieved because such existing rights continued in 
force, subject to the terms and conditions, until termination thereof.254 
Some form of continuity of mineral tenure was afforded during the 
interim period by granting an exclusive right to a holder of an UOOR 
to apply for a prospecting right or a mining right.255 Prospecting or 
mining could continue if a prospecting permit or mining authorisation 
existed immediately prior to the enactment of the MPRDA. Security of 
tenure was, however, not enhanced by the shortening of the unexpired 
periods of UOORs to one year by the transitional arrangements.256 
UOORs were terminated upon the expiry of the interim period,257 or 
the grant or the refusal of the prospecting right or mining right.258 As 
stated before, termination of transitional rights is by nature contrary 
to security of tenure, and is ameliorated by acquisition of new rights 
248 Ibid at [90], [95].
249 Ibid at [91].
250 P J Badenhorst, ‘Large-scale Expropriation of Mineral Rights in South Africa: The Agri 
South Africa fiasco’ (2012) 31(3) ARELJ 205; ‘Expropriation of “Unused Old Order 
Rights” by the MPRDA: You had nothing! Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri SA (CALS 
amicus curiae)’ 2013 THRHR 472.
251 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC).
252 One year or the shorter grant period.
253 See ‘Payment of compensation for loss of prospecting and mining rights’ above, 24.
254 Item 8(1) of the transitional arrangements.
255 Item 8(2).
256 Ibid.
257 Item 8(4).
258 Item 8(3).
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during an application process and proposed payment of compensation 
upon expropriation of OORs.259
 Security of tenure was provided to mortgagees of UOORs only during 
the one-year interim period because of the continuation of the UOOR 
to serve as an object of security.
(b) Relying on the list of factors supporting security of tenure, as mentioned 
by Dale et al above, it is submitted that security of tenure was not 
provided for the holders of UOORs by the application mechanism; 
the reason being, it was not a conversion process because rights had 
to be granted anew. Negotiation or execution of new prospecting or 
mining rights had to take place before new rights could be granted. 
Consultation with and objections by third parties to the granting of 
the new prospecting or mining rights could have taken place. No link 
was created between the terms and conditions of the UOORs and the 
new prospecting or mining right, because new rights were granted 
upon application. The Minister or delegate had the power to refuse 
the application and/or grant it to another applicant.260
 It should be remembered that the MPRDA does not have as an objective 
to provide security of tenure if prospecting or mining operations did 
not take place upon enactment of the Act. Security of mineral tenure 
was, therefore, lacking in the case of UOORs.
 Continuity of mineral rights, prospecting or mining rights was only 
achieved if a new application was successful. The granting of new 
applications was subject to the discretion of the Minister or delegate. 
Only upon the grant of a new prospecting right was continuation in the 
sense of progression from prospecting to retention or mining secured. 
The grounds for cancellation of converted prospecting rights or mining 
rights or the grounds for termination of these rights would be the same 
as for prospecting or mining rights being granted. The same applies for 
appeals against refusals to grant new prospecting or mining rights to 
former holders of UOORs. These aspects have been discussed before.261 
 UOORs also constituted constitutional property,262 and item 12 of the 
transitional arrangements also provided for compensation if it could 
be proven that UOORs were expropriated. We have seen before263 that 
259 See Dale, see n 82 above, 843.
260 Sishen Iron Ore Company (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources (unreported decision) 
Case no 28980/10 (NGP), at [89].
261 See ‘OOPMRs’ above.
262 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC), at [50].
263 See ‘OOPMRs’ above, 30–31.
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the Supreme Court of Appeal decided in Minister of Minerals and Energy 
v Agri SA264 that all pre-existing mineral rights were not expropriated 
under the MPRDA owing to the absence of a deprivation or acquisition 
of property (as requirements of expropriation) by the state because 
the right to mine was never vested in holders of mineral rights but in 
the state. It was decided that holders of UOORs were not deprived of 
their rights because they not only retained a preference to apply for 
a prospecting right or a mining right for a year, but ‘would acquire 
more extensive rights if they sought and obtained a prospecting right 
or mining right’.265 Deprivation would take place upon ‘failure to 
apply for a right to exercise them’.266 The time limit of one year to 
apply for new rights was not perceived as a deprivation of rights.267 The 
majority of the Constitutional Court in Agri South Africa v Minister of 
Minerals and Energy 268 decided that holders of UOORs were deprived 
of the ‘free or unregulated right to sterilise mineral rights’, the ‘right 
to sell or lease mineral rights’ and mineral right/UOOR for which a 
prospecting right or mining right could not be acquired.269 The court 
thus decided those elements of or the pre-existing mineral right were 
deprived by the MPRDA.270 The majority of the Constitutional Court, 
however, decided that (in accordance with the construction of the state 
acting as custodian of the mineral resources on behalf of the people), 
the state did not acquire any mineral rights.271 Mogoeng CJ found that 
‘[n]either the state nor other entities or people acquired the rights 
to sterilise, monopolise the exploitation of minerals or sell, lease or 
cede’ the UOORs of the company.272 In the absence of expropriation, 
264 2012 (5) SA 1 (SCA).
265 At [97].
266 Ibid.
267 Ibid.
268 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC), at [51]. See also [2], [66]. The minority of the Constitutional 
Court also found that deprivation of property took place (at [92]).
269 At [66].
270 At [53].
271 At [68], [71]. The minority of the Constitutional Court, however, decided that the 
state acquired: (a) ’the power of disposition that private mineral ownership entailed’, 
(b) ‘the power to allocate and dispose of the exploitation rights’ (at [81]), or (c) ‘at 
least some of the powers and competencies’ (at [106]) of holders of unused old order 
rights. In other words, expropriation did take place.
272 At [71].
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compensation was, therefore, not payable by the state.273 The lack 
of security of tenure provided to holders of UOORs was, therefore, 
exacerbated by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional 
Court in the Agri South Africa line of decisions. 
 Upon termination of UOORs, security of tenure was not provided to 
mortgagees of such rights because the MPRDA does not require that 
new prospecting or mining rights must be registered subject to such 
prior existing mortgages.274 In other words, transposition of existing 
mortgages did not take place.
 Upon the grant of a prospecting or mining right, such rights have the 
features of security of tenure as have been discussed before.275
Comment
By way of comment, the following can be indicated.
Finding
Viewed objectively, the MPRDA affords security of mineral tenure to holders 
of prospecting rights and mining rights, and afforded security of tenure to 
holders of OOPMRs who converted their respective rights to prospecting and 
mining rights. The MPRDA may, however, in future be amended to reduce 
the current level of security of mineral tenure.276 
The security of tenure as provided for in the MPRDA should, however, 
not be seen in isolation but within the wider context of the objectives of the 
MPRDA to transform the mining industry in South Africa.277 A fine balancing 
act between competing objectives of the MPRDA such as transformation 
of the industry and provision of security of tenure is required from the 
Department and courts.
273 According to a minority of the Constitutional Court the transitional arrangements 
constituted ‘compensation in kind’ – measures that sought to give effect to the requirement 
of payment of just and equitable compensation for property as required by s 25(3) of the 
Constitution (at [90]; see also [88]). In other words, even though expropriation did take 
place, compensation was provided for by the transitional arrangements.
274 Dale, see n 82 above, at 845 fn 121.
275 See ‘Security of mineral tenure of prospecting or mining rights’ above, 16–25.
276 In the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Bill 2013, the administrative 
discretion of the Minister is broadened without the provision of objective criteria to 
assess the discretion of the Minister. Many of the time periods of the MPRDA are to 
be replaced with ‘prescribed periods’ of time to be determined by the Minister, which 
replacement reduces certainty and security of tenure.
277 See MPRDA above, 11.
35Security of Mineral tenure in South africa: carrot or Stick?
Holders of UOORs who did not apply for new prospecting or mining 
rights were not afforded security of tenure, and their loss of UOORs was 
not ameliorated by compensation. The lack of security of tenure afforded to 
holders of UOORs and the loss of their UOORs, however, has to be viewed 
within the context of transformation of the industry and utilisation of such 
resources for purposes of the attainment of the constitutionally and statutorily 
based transformational goals of redress and access to mineral resources.278 
Payment of compensation for their loss would, however, not have been 
contrary to the transformative objectives of the MPRDA.
The courts take part in balancing transformation and security of tenure. 
The courts are conscious of the security of tenure provisions.279 In Holcim 
SA (Pty) Ltd v Prudent Investors (Pty) Ltd,280 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
relied on the legislature’s objective of security of tenure for its decision that 
the holder of an old order mining right need not have conducted mining 
operations prior to the MPRDA, in respect of each and every property that 
was the subject of a mining licence, in order to qualify for an old order mining 
right in respect of all the properties. The courts are also fully conscious of 
the transformative nature of the MPRDA.281
Security of tenure afforded by the MPRDA will, however, be dependent 
on: (a) the role of the state as custodian of mineral resources in the 
administration of the MPRDA; and (b) external factors. This would entail 
security of tenure in the broadest possible sense of the word.
Role of the state as custodian
In terms of section 3(1) of the MPRDA, the mineral resources ‘are the 
common heritage of all the people of South Africa and the State is the 
custodian thereof for the benefit of all South Africans’. Neither the meaning 
278 P J Badenhorst and N J J Olivier, ‘Large Scale Expropriations of Mineral Rights in South 
Africa: The Agri South Africa Finale’ (submitted for publication in 2013/4 ARELJ). 
279 Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd (unreported, TPD case no 
39808/2007, 18 November 2008), at [28]; Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and 
Energy; Van Rooyen v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2010 (1) SA 104 (GNP), at [13]; 
Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 (5) SA 1 (SCA), at [88], [90]; 
Xstrata South Africa (Pty) Ltd v SFF Association 2012 (5) SA 60 (SCA) 60, at [8]. Minister 
of Mineral Resources of the RSA v Sishen Iron Ore (394/12) [2013] ZASCA 50 (28 March 
2013), at [29].
280 [2011] 1 All SA 364 (SCA), at [1], [12], [30] and [32].
281 Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 (3) BCLR 229 (CC), 
at [3]; Xstrata (Pty) Ltd v SFF Association 2012 (5) SA 60 (SCA) at [1]; Maccsand (Pty) Ltd 
v City of Cape Town 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC), at [3]; Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri 
South Africa 2012 (5) SA 1 (SCA), at [1].
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of custodian of mineral resources has been clarified by the courts282 nor have 
the custodial duties of the state been spelled out. 
The MPRDA must be administered by the Minister and the Department 
in a sound manner. The MPRDA has, however, at times been administered 
in a haphazard way by the Department. A few examples may be provided. 
The alleged haphazard allocation of prospecting rights by officials of the 
Department in disregard to its duties and responsibilities resulted in a 
national moratorium283 being placed on the granting of prospecting rights, 
to enable the state to first audit and examine alleged malpractices. For 
instance, a prospecting right was granted by the Department in respect of a 
wine estate in the Cape winelands to the state-owned mining company, African 
Exploration Mining and Finance Corporation, to prospect and possibly 
mine in the Bottelary and Durbanville areas.284 Common sense eventually 
prevailed and the Department backed down.285 The national moratorium 
has since lapsed. In Minister of Mineral Resources of the RSA v Sishen Iron Ore 286 
the Department granted prospecting rights to a politically well-connected 
applicant287 during the conversion of an old order mining right that was 
jointly held by two companies.288 The prospecting rights granted were in 
respect of properties upon which the Sishen mine was situated. Mining 
operations at the Sishen mine covered 1,417,767 hectares of land. Large 
282 See Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC), at [71]); 
Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 (5) SA 1 (SCA), at [86].
283 The moratorium was from 1 September 2010 to 28 February 2011 (GN 768 in 
Government Gazette 33511 of 31 August 2010). The moratorium was subsequently 
extended (GN 160 in Government Gazette 34057 of 28 February 2011; GN 287 in 
Government Gazette 34171 of 31 March 2011).
284 ‘Department backs off from winelands mining’, www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/
department-backs-off-from-winelands-mining-1.476046.
285 A spokesperson for the Department, Jeremy Michaels, stated: ‘The state-owned mining 
company applied, from what we understand, for the prospecting licence on the basis 
of a geological survey, not knowing what the land was being used for. Then... they 
discovered that these were wine farms. We understand that they will withdraw their 
application. But whether they proceed or not, their application will not be granted. A 
responsible government has to balance the needs of the country, and clearly, in this 
case, we can’t be disrupting the wine-making industry’ (ibid).
286 (394/12) [2013] ZASCA 50 (28 March 2013).
287 ‘Court overturns ICT’s Sishen right’ Independent Online, www.iol.co.za/
business/companies/court-overturns-ict-s-sishen-right-1.1199490?ot=inmsa.
ArticlePrintPageLayout.ot; ‘Round one goes to Kumba in Sishen battle’ Mail & 
Guardian, http://mg.co.za/article/2011-12-15-round-one-goes-to-kumba-in-sishen-
battle; ‘Opportunistic ploy by politically-connected thwarted – Leon’ Business Day,  
www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=161375. 
288 See P J Badenhorst and N J J Olivier, ‘Conversion of “old order mining rights”: 
Sleeping at the MPRDA’s wheel of (mis)fortune?’ (2013) 76 THRHR 269; ‘Conversion 
of jointly-held old order mining rights: an all and nothing ruling?’ (to be published in 
2014 THRHR).
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quantities of iron ore had been mined for 24 hours per day, seven days per 
week at the mine, from the early 1950s. Extensive mining infrastructure was 
situated on the land.289 This led to the following comment by Southwood 
AJA: ‘The irrationality of granting a prospecting right to search for iron 
ore on properties on which one of the biggest iron ore mines in the world 
is situated is manifest.’290 The Supreme Court of Appeal decided that the 
mining company that applied for conversion of its mining right became the 
sole holder of the new mining right.291 Another example was the unequal 
treatment of an (indigenous) host community by the Department when their 
preferential prospecting rights (provided by the MPRDA) were sidelined 
in favour of a company who applied for and acquired prospecting rights 
in respect of community-held land.292 In the competition between holders 
of OOPMRs and applicants for new rights, the Department did not always 
protect the security of tenure of holders of OOPMRs.293 It is conceded that 
the task of the government in balancing the objectives of transformation of 
the mineral industry and affording security of tenure is not an easy one and 
guidelines will probably develop over time.
If in a scenario like, for instance, the Amplats dispute, rights are indeed 
cancelled and mining rights are awarded to a more meritorious applicant, 
such termination (and grant) would be judicially reviewable as constituting or 
not constituting a lawful administrative action. If an application for review of 
the Minister’s decision is unsuccessful and/or an attempt is made to construe 
the termination as a possible act of expropriation in terms of section 25(2) 
of the Constitution, such termination would, by analogy with the decision of 
the Constitutional Court in Agri South Africa, not amount to expropriation. In 
terms of the custodian construction, the rights are not being ‘reacquired’ by 
the state but merely allocated by the state to, and later acquired by, another 
applicant. Even though speculative at this stage, the same fate as suffered by 
holders of UOORs may then be suffered by mining companies. In the minority 
289 Minister of Mineral Resources of the RSA v Sishen Iron Ore (394/12) [2013] ZASCA 50  
(28 March 2013), at [8].
290 Minister of Mineral Resources of the RSA v Sishen Iron Ore (394/12) [2013] ZASCA 50  
(28 March 2013), at [8]. Nonetheless, the Department appealed against this decision, 
which appeal was heard by the Constitutional Court during September 2013. The 
decision has not been rendered as of 5 December 2013.
291 Minister of Mineral Resources of the RSA v Sishen Iron Ore (394/12) [2013] ZASCA 50  
(28 March 2013), at [55], [56]. It was no longer necessary to buy out the prospecting 
rights of the outsider company.
292 Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 (3) BCLR 229 (CC), at 
[79]–[80]; P J Badenhorst, N J J Olivier and C Williams, ‘The final judgement’ (2012) 
TSAR 326, at paras 5.1 and 8.
293 See further P J Badenhorst and H Mostert, ‘Duelling Prospecting Rights: A Non-
Custodial Second?’ (2008) 4 TSAR 819.
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judgment of the Constitutional Court in Agri South Africa,294 Froneman J warned 
against the dangers of the custodian construction: 
‘If private ownership of minerals can be abolished without just and 
equitable compensation – by the construction that when the state 
allocates the substance of old rights to others it does not do so as the 
holder of those rights – what prevents the abolition of private ownership 
of any, or all, property in the same way?’
This warning should be heeded as the custodian construction is inimical to 
the security of mineral (or other) tenure.
The state should, rather, be the custodian in the true sense of the word 
of not only the mineral resources of South Africa but also of the security of 
mineral tenure.
External factors
External factors such as endemic governmental corruption,295 decline of 
infrastructure, problems with the supply of electricity296 and water for mining 
purposes, and labour and social unrest may impact on security of mineral 
tenure as well. The recent problems experienced by the platinum industry 
are a prime example of the impact of some of these factors on mining 
production and, indirectly, on security of mineral tenure. An ‘ungovernable’ 
or disrupted mine offers no de facto security of mineral tenure to a company 
and its shareholders.
294 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC), at [105].
295 During 2012, South Africa was ranked 79/178 on the corruption perception index, 
by Transparency International, www.transparency.org/country#ZAF and 53/150 by 
Worldaudit, www.worldaudit.org/corruption.htm in its corruption rankings. See 
further ‘SA gee pas aan met korrupsie’, www.rapport.co.za/Suid-Afrika/Nuus/SA-gee-
pas-aan-met-korrupsie-2013071. 
296 Two of BHP Billiton’s aluminum plants were switched off during winter in 2013 
because the demand for electricity exceeded the amount of power available (‘Eskom 
skakel smelters af weens kragtekort’, www.beeld.com/sake/2013-06-14-eskom-skakel-
smelters-af-weens-kragtekort) Eskom, the national supplier of electricity, recently 
announced that the new Medupi power plant would be unable to deliver its first 
power in December 2013 as scheduled (‘Gigaba disturbed over Medupi’, www.iol.
co.za/business/companies/gigaba-distubed-over-medupi-1.1545059. See also ‘Medupi 
delayed: What went wrong?’ http://mg.co.za/article/2013-07-08-medupi-delayed-what-
went-wrong; ‘Numsa eis ondersoek na “Medupi-knoeiery”’, http://afrikaans.news24.
com/Sake/Nuus/Numsa-eis-ondersoek-na-Medupi-knoeiery-20130711; ‘Eskom powers 
headless into Medupi mess’, http://mg.co.za/article/2013-07-19-00-eskom-powers-
headless-into-medupi-mess.
39Security of Mineral tenure in South africa: carrot or Stick?
Importance of security of mineral tenure
The Minister and the Department should realise that security of tenure is a 
tool to attract foreign as well as local investors, rather than an instrument to 
punish mining companies by threating that it will disregard it if matters do 
not go the government’s way. The government has to ensure an investment 
and mining climate that is in line with the stated objectives297 in the MPRDA 
and is conducive to security of tenure.
Conclusion
The MPRDA provides security of mineral tenure to holders of prospecting 
rights and mining rights, and afforded security of tenure to holders of 
OOPMRs who converted their rights into new rights. Signs of erosion of 
security of mineral tenure afforded by the MPRDA have started with the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Amendment Bill 2013. The 
security of mineral tenure as provided for in the MPRDA should not, however, 
be seen in isolation but within the context of the transformation objectives 
of the MPRDA. A fine balancing act between objectives of transformation 
of the industry and provision of security of tenure is required from the 
Department and courts.
In general, the South African courts are conscious of the importance of 
security of tenure and transformation objectives and have applied them. The 
MPRDA, however, did not afford security of tenure to holders of UOORs 
who did not apply for new prospecting or mining rights. Provisions of the 
MPRDA have been interpreted by the courts in the Agri South Africa decision 
in a way that is inimical to security of tenure. The outcome of the decision in 
Agri South Africa has to be viewed within the context of the attainment of the 
constitutionally and statutorily based transformational goals of redress and 
access to mineral resources. Payment of compensation to holders of UOORs 
for their loss, however, would not have been contrary to the transformative 
objectives of the MPRDA. 
The same fate as that suffered by the claimant in Agri SA decisions may, 
arguably, be suffered by holders of new prospecting and mining rights if such 
rights are terminated by the Minister and allocated to another applicant. 
If an application for the review of the Minister’s decision to terminate (or 
grant rights) is unsuccessful and/or an attempt is made to construe such 
action as an expropriation of property in terms of section 25(2) of the 
Constitution, such allocation would not (in accordance with the custodian 
297 See MPRDA, s 2.
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construction), in terms of the decision of the Constitutional Court in Agri 
South Africa, amount to expropriation of rights because of the erroneous 
view that acquisition of rights by the state did not take place. If this practice 
is to be followed by the Department, it would eventually destroy the notion 
of security of mineral tenure altogether.
Security of mineral tenure in South Africa also depends on rational 
administration by the Department and external factors such as 
maintenance of infrastructure, supply of water and electricity, a stable 
labour force and a peaceful and prosperous society. With the present 
government and its unsuccessful track record of good governance, it 
seems highly unlikely that most of these external factors will improve in 
the foreseeable future. Security of tenure on paper may be replaced by 
the reality on the ground of governmental maladministration, the dangers 
of unequal distribution of wealth among the people, labour and social 
unrest, a decline of infrastructure and sporadic supply of electricity and 
water for mining purposes. Security of tenure, in the broadest sense of 
the word, should be viewed and cherished by the government as a carrot 
for foreign investment and insurance for economic survival, rather than 
a stick to achieve short-term political outcomes.
